The use of monetary policy in India has been constrained by a loose fiscal policy and capital flows. Capital inflows have the potential to cause a Dutch Disease-type situation.
I. INTRODUCTION
India embarked on its market liberalization journey in the early 1990s (although the 1980s saw the slow dismantling of some of the pervasive quantitative restrictions). It liberalized the trade in goods, removed controls on capital flows considerably and made some progress towards the privatization of the loss-making public enterprises.
Upon its independence from Britain in 1947, India had adopted an inward-looking approach to planning for industrialization. Unlike a large number of developing countries at a similar stage of development, India had a well developed financial market and a diversified production structure. It was also the recipient of large doses of foreign direct investment (FDI), since a significant part of the industrial sector was owned by the British. There were also (mainly) foreign-owned mines and plantations.
Industrialization required finance and several development finance institutions were setup. The Imperial Bank was nationalized in 1955. In 1969, fourteen other commercial banks were nationalized. What followed was an era of populism and financial repression.
Financial repression is not a structural feature of development--it arose out of populist pressures. Funds were required to finance the losses of inefficiently run public-sector manufacturing units and to subsidize politically favored lobbies. As a perpetual borrower the government was interested in keeping the cost of borrowing low-hence the stateowned banks and financial repression. After nationalization, while the state-owned banks were successful in mobilizing savings, the asset side of the banks' balance sheet deteriorated. Banks were required to hold a high cash reserve ratio (CRR) and in addition hold government securities under the Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR). The CRR and SLR often accounted for more than half of the banking system's assets-after these requirements (and others) very little was left for commercial lending. iii Aggregate numbers paint a rosy picture, though, e.g., if one were to look at bank branches per capita or the M3 to GDP ratio. The decisions on the real depreciation was taken by the Union Cabinet--such was the centralized process of decision-making in the country (and the inconsequential nature of the Reserve Bank of India)! Exports rose at an annual rate of five percent during this period, and imports (which were also liberalized) at eight per cent. The fiscal deficit stood at 8.4 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 while and the current account deficit was 3.1 per cent of GDP. The Gulf War in 1990--the shock was temporary and at most amounted to one per cent of GDP--showed the fragility of the macroeconomic balance in India by causing a full-blown balance of payments crisis. This macroeconomic crisis was followed by the period of liberalization. India opened up its foreign trade, the capital account considerably, while continuing to run large budget deficits. This chapter will deal with the issues of capital flows and monetary policy vi , leaving other chapters to deal with other aspects of macroeconomic policy-see in particular, the chapters by Buiter and Patel, Kletzer, and Acharya.
II. PREREQUISITES FOR CAPITAL ACCOUNT CONVERTIBILITY
About thirty years back, comparing the experience of East Asia's spectacular growth with those of economies that were trying to grow by restricting international trade, policy analysts called for removal of all controls on international trade. Some economists, with full faith in the working of financial markets, extended this call for a "cold turkey" removal of restrictions on trade to the financial markets.
Thus proponents of financial liberalization point out the efficiency gains in removing restrictions in asset markets (just like in the goods markets) and equating marginal cost to marginal benefit. The market would allow consumption smoothing across periods and states of nature. The former arises when financial markets allow individuals to borrow in anticipation of rising incomes, as is the case for a developing country. The latter says access to international markets allows diversification of risk. In addition to these two, there is also the consumption augmenting channel-firms can borrow cheaply in international markets for domestic investment. Liberalization of financial markets result in markets being created, where none existed before and activities like hedging and insurance evolve endogenously. Of course, whatever the drawbacks of liberalized financial markets, there is the ideological pressure (from vested interests) not to regulate at all. vii Opponents say that the financial markets are not like competitive goods markets due to the problems of "the free rider", moral hazard and adverse selection. Informational asymmetries result in the financial markets being fragile. In addition, in a developing country with "thin asset markets" there are dangers of aggregate risk of volatile capital flows and the resulting volatility of non-traded goods and asset prices in the recipient country. Developing countries also tend to be those which run large budget deficits and have financial repression (to provide the debtor government with a perennial source of cheap funds). These macroeconomic characteristics raise the risks from opening up to capital flows.
While the debate about the desirability or otherwise of financial regulation was going on, financial innovation in the advanced capitalist countries had moved at remarkable speed spurred on by, among other things, the breakthroughs in information technology. New financial instruments emerged and the hitherto distinct functions of existing financial institutions got blurred. One source of headache for regulatory authorities was from the development of instruments that were close substitutes for those that the authorities sought to control. International movement of capital reinforced the difficulty of financial regulation, since now capital could flow out of the more regulated economy. This created a pressure for "a race to the bottom" in regulation.
This "cold turkey" liberalization advice immediately met with resistance from real world facts. Over time the profession became more cautious. Trade liberalization was, for most part, a good idea. Financial liberalization, on the other hand, needs to be "sequenced".
This view has only been reinforced by the lessons from the Asian and Latin American crises of the late 1990s. The recent world financial crisis and slowdown of the real economy that followed in its wake has only strengthened the case for more regulation of the financial sector and capital flows.
Before turning to the recent Indian experience of macroeconomic policy in the presence of capital flows, I will very briefly summarize the literature on capital account convertibility. Two kinds of perquisites have been mentioned: (1) financial development; and (3) appropriate macroeconomic policies. I discuss these in turn.
(a) Financial Sector Reforms
Financial sector reforms in developing countries pose challenges even in the absence of international capital flows. Capital flows exacerbate the problems.
The absorption of capital inflows, most of which tend to be short term, requires a resilient domestic financial system. Market determined interest rates, prudential norms, development of a money market, a market for government securities, a foreign exchange market, the existence of a yield curve for pricing floating rate instruments etc., are prerequisites for handling international financial flows. In addition to currency mismatch there could also be maturity mismatch. The definition, of provisioning etc., for non-performing assets are still evolving in developing economies. If capital flows are prone to reversals, and generally they are, then with some nominal wage-price inertia it may be desirable to have a fixed exchange rate regime. In periods of inflows, a floating exchange rate regime would cause an immediate real appreciation. The output and employment costs of these could be substantial. With a fixed exchange rate the overvaluation occurs gradually over time. Thus if a reversal of capital flows were to take place, output losses would be minimized. Ex ante, it is very difficult for the authorities, given the few episodes of international capital flows, to decide whether the inflow of capital is permanent or temporary, and to decide on an appropriate policy response.
A large budget deficit (or more correctly, debt) raises the real interest rate. This will attract inflows-the story of sterilization above becomes relevant, with sterilization adding to the fiscal woes. This will cause a real appreciation. An outflow would take place if the deficit was deemed unsustainable. This outflow could have balance sheet effects mentioned above.
III. INDIA'S MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE LAST TWO DECADES
First I look at the performance of the Indian economy since the early 1990s. Then I will look at government finances, capital flows and the conduct of monetary policy.
As is evident from Table 1, India's GDP growth has been very healthy since the beginning of the 1990s-only in three years since 1990-91 has it been less than five percent. Its GDP growth rate has been quite robust even in the last three years, when elsewhere in the world there was hardly any growth. A point that I will not dwell upon here is the less-than-satisfactory growth in employment-something that has implications for income distribution. Inflation (as measured by the RBI's preferred index-the wholesale price index (WPI)) has been above ten percent in five years. The saving and investment ratios to GDP have increased by as much as 15 percent of GDP in the last decade. India today saves and invests a little less than forty percent of its GDP.
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The share of agriculture has been falling over time, while services have registered an impressive increase. What has not happened is growth in the share of industrial output (indeed this is one of the reasons why employment has lagged behind GDP growth).
Agriculture accounts for about sixty percent of total employment, contributes less than a quarter to GDP (industry's share in GDP is a quarter, while services account for half). Turning briefly to fiscal policy-this topic is discussed in detail elsewhere in this volume. Here I want to highlight (from Table 2 ) that India's fiscal policy has been lacking in discipline. The combined fiscal deficits of the centre and states has been between six and ten percent of GDP. With the global meltdown all that changed. India faced the problem of the other high deficit countries viz. if the budget is in deficit during good years, there is not much room for "counter-cyclical" fiscal policy.
The budget deficits have ballooned of late and fiscal rectitude has been put on a backburner.
The expansionary stance of the government is responsible for a real appreciation-government demand is directed towards the not-traded goods, causing the prices of these to rise. The real interest rate rises and the debtor (the government) resorts to financial repression.
IV. MONETARY POLICY AND CAPITAL FLOWS
The Reserve Bank of India is not an "independent" central bank. One only has to look at the list of its Governors in the recent past to realize that an overwhelming majority of them had served as Secretary at the Ministry of Finance, and only on their superannuation were thy appointed as Governors. The Reserve Bank has the unenviable task of maintaining macroeconomic stability while ensuring that the high volume of government debt is held by the banking sector. It sets itself no explicit policy targets, nor does it announce any policy rules. To quote Dr Y.V. Reddy, one of the more successful RBI Governors in the recent periods: "…unorthodox policies have assured the stability of the Indian financial system…rather than achieving ritualistic compliance with pre-set rules." He is saying there is complete discretion in the conduct of policy and he is proud to say so! Having said this, it must be added that in the last fifteen years capital flows to This has encouraged some analysts (e.g., Kletzer and Kohli (2000) to try and estimate the monetary model of exchange rate determination for India. As is well known that the monetary model assumes purchasing power parity (PPP) xviii and uses money market equilibrium conditions the two countries (for bilateral exchange rate determination) to determine the nominal exchange rate. The problem with such an analysis is that it assumes that the exchange rate is fully flexible, while in India's case the RBI was intervening to keep the real exchange rate from appreciating. This is called sterilized intervention.
xx This is what the RBI did (see Table 3 ). Note this policy can be implemented if the central bank has some control over the interest rate-it has to make asset-holders want to hold domestic securities because they give a higher rate of return than the rate of return on foreign securities. Because of pervasive capital controls, the RBI was able to do this. This policy can insulate the real exchange rate (and the deleterious effects of capital flows on the economy) but is not without costs. The RBI is exchanging low-return foreign asset (either foreign currency or US treasury bills) for high-interest government securities-this is what is meant by a "quasi-fiscal cost" of sterilization. The sterilization policy would become untenable as the RBI continues to accumulate foreign exchange reserves, thus driving up interest rates. The RBI via sterilization was able to prevent a real appreciation from occurring, which in turn prevented a 'Dutch Disease' xxi . In the face of continued capital inflows, the costs of this strategy go on mounting.
The above analysis is true for all kinds of capital inflows, whether it is FDI or FII.
If capital inflows are seen to be a problem then there is a case for ordering these flows in terms of their benefits-FDI brings with it advantages of new technology, management etc. that FII flows do not. additional reserve holdings, in terms precaution against normal contingencies, is low and given the opportunity cost (i.e., the quasi fiscal costs) the net benefit is possibly negative. Absent these capital flows, there would be real depreciation that could allow the economy to run a trade (and current account) surplus.
Below I shall argue that the real exchange rate that has emerged from the RBI's intervention is not compatible with industrialization to relocate a large number of low productive workers in agriculture, using the world markets. It is not even clear that the RBI's action have resulted in an exchange rate compatible with external balance (i.e. zero current account). In the face of the onslaught of capital flows, the RBI has, at best, engaged in fire-fighting.
V. ECONOMIC THEORY, EAST ASIA, LATIN AMERICA AND INDIA
There is a view that is very popular in the policy circles in India, and it gives a clue about how some influential people think about these matters. It is as follows. For a higher growth rate the rate of investment needs to be increased. One way to achieve this is to reinforce domestic savings with capital inflows by running a current account deficit.
This is unexceptionable insofar as one is financing new investment by FDI-if this goes
into acquiring an existing firm, it does not count as investment.
What As developing economies opened up their capital accounts to international flows, they soon found out that asset markets are different from goods markets and developing country markets different from those in developed countries. As discussed in Section II, the initial Southern Cone (Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay) liberalization in the early 1980s pointed to a lack of macroeconomic balance-on opening up, budget deficits turned into current-account deficits. The literature that emerged suggested a sequencing of liberalization rather than a 'big bang'. In the light of the East Asian experience, inadequate regulation and supervision of the financial sector, including the government guaranteeing the liabilities of the banking system, have been added to the list.
The absence of a well-developed, well-regulated financial market, reforms that could be beneficial otherwise interact with some other feature of an underdeveloped market that acts as a distortion. Developing economies have financial market lacking depth and transparency. Acquiring these qualities can not be speeded up too much.
Therefore an economy with an unsustainable fiscal policy may find that it difficult to borrow on favorable terms, if it is able to borrow at all, following an opening up of outflows as capital flows out-international markets impose discipline as Diaz-Alejandro had predicted. This could lead to an expectation of monetization of the deficits and cause a steep currency depreciation that, in turn, causes a financial crisis. If the exchange rate is fixed, then this expectation of a future monetization could cause the peg to collapse and a large loss of foreign-exchange reserves. A 'surprise' inflation does benefit the government qua borrower in that it reduces the real value of the debt. This, however, is not true of an economy like India, where most debt is held by the financial institutions owned by the government.
I now turn to the macro aspects of capital flows, i.e. smoothing and augmenting of consumption by borrowing and lending. Consumption-smoothing allows income fluctuations to be smoothed out, at least in theory. What does economic theory, in particular growth theory, have to say on this?
Growth theory has very little to say on the capital account. There was a literature on the stages of the balance of payments that suggested that in the early stages of development a country would run a current deficit and import capital. Later optimizing models (either in the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans tradition, or the overlapping generations variety) suggested that a developing economy should run a current account deficit. In effect output and the capital stock increase but the new capital is foreign-owned xxxiv . In these models, if a relative price appears (i.e. the model is more than one sector), a real depreciation is a terms of trade deterioration.
The data on capital flows in the world economy decisively contradicts the prediction that capital flows from the rich to the poor countries. Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2007) show comprehensively that capital flows from the developing countries to the rich ones. This is true even if we take out the oil-exporters from the sample, or, for that matter, the US-China balance of payments figures. We have a conundrum here that needs explanation. In effect, the country concerned is moving the bulk of its population from low-value agriculture to industry using the world markets. Once industrialization gets going, over time, this economy moves up the quality ladder by supplying more sophisticated industrial goods.
If there are imperfections in the credit markets, borrowing from abroad typically involves sovereign risk. One can be sure that these risks are greater than lending to domestic firms (because, for example, of a common legal authority etc. for the latter kind of lending). Thus a growth strategy that involves generating higher saving (backed by a relatively closed capital account) can make funds available for lending domestically on better terms than borrowing abroad.
Going back to India's experience, we see that it runs a huge deficit in merchandise trade and a hefty surplus on services. One way of organizing one's thoughts on this issue is by thinking of the goods that India has a comparative advantage in, starting with the maximum and going down the order. Make an additional (heroic) assumption that this ordering stays independent of factor prices. In the domain of traditional trade theory, trade is balanced and presumably there is an exchange of goods, with India's exports being where it has the maximum comparative advantage, and its imports being where comparative advantage is least. When trade is unbalanced, then absolute advantage can determine the cutoff of the goods to be exported (and imported). iv It is very interesting to note that in country where very little attention was paid to macroeconomic constraints or had no academic macroeconomic tradition worth the mention, two major policy shifts arose out of macroeconomic crises. In the mid-sixties a crisis, brought about a shift to the left and in the earlynineties another crisis heralded the era of liberalization. v If allowance is made for tax breaks and other subsidies to exporters, the real depreciation could be as high as 40 per cent. vi I will not deal with the effects of the recent surge in inflation, except in passing. This is too recent an occurrence to be discussed in a chapter in a handbook. vii The sub-prime crisis is a good example of this. The fact that asset prices could not rise forever at a rate higher than, say, the interest rate was ignored (due to the muscle power of financial institutions and the complicity of the regulators). viii For instance banks and building societies have become indistinguishable from each other. The line separating commercial banks and investment banks have become indistinct, as has the role of insurance companies from mutual funds. ix Indeed this is true for the advanced capitalist countries also e.g. the proposed constraints on the balance sheets of banks in the wake of the recent financial crisis.
x Edwards (1999) casts doubt on whether even the composition of the capital flows was altered. xi Empirically, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that the banking crisis occurs before the exchange rate crisis. xii Investment exceeds savings because the current account of the balance of payments is in deficit. xiii The fiscal deficit is an imperfect measure of profligacy of the governments. For instance, it counts privatization revenues on par with taxes, than as a method of financing the deficit. It also does not include the off-budget (actual and potential) liabilities. xiv These refer to the combined sate and central deficits. xv Since then FDI outflows have been liberalized considerably. xvi In this section, I will examine the annual figures for India's capital account. If one were to examine the quarterly or monthly figures, there is much volatility in the individual components of the capital account. These may have important short run policy ramifications but are of second-order importance in my, admittedly, broad-brush treatment here. xvii The calculation of REER implicitly assumes that all goods are tradable. An alternative definition is the relative price of traded to non-traded goods. Kohli and Mohapatra (2007) use this approach, assuming a that if five percent of a good is traded it is classified as a traded good. They test the Balassa -Samuelson effect for India and find mixed effects. xviii This can be relaxed to incorporate changes in the real exchange rate. But this is almost never done in empirical analysis. One testable implication of assuming PPP is that a rise in the nominal interest rate in any country (because of PPP, this is a rise expected inflation) causes its exchange rate to depreciate. In the Indian date this is never observed except when inflation rose just before the 2008 world financial crisis and the RBI reacted very aggressively by raising interest rates. xix There is a version of the monetary model that would take into account reserve changes-the exchange market pressure model (due to Girton and Roper (1977) . xx The money supply is the object that is "sterilized". xxi A referee has questioned the use of this expression in the Indian context. In the Netherlands, the "Dutch Disease" occurred due to that country's possessing of gas and oil in the North Sea. This led to capital flows to the Netherlands causing the guilder to appreciate. I use this expression more generally, where a "winner" attracts capital flows that reners its manufacturing sector uncompetitive in the international markets. xxii Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) model the difference between a developed country's financial market and that of an underdeveloped one by assuming that the former can make foreign currency payments using its domestic currency denominated assets while an underdeveloped economy cannot shift its domestic assets for foreign currency payments. xxiii ECBs stood at US$ 4.37 billion compared to FDI at US$ 2.27 billion and the FII figure of US$3.02 in 2007-08.
